This paper investigates the effectiveness of central bank communication when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations that are updated through social dynamics.
that is consistent with a random walk. We set up our model so that each rule is indeed an unbiased forecast of inflation when adopted by all firms. For example, if all firms use the central bank's announcements as a basis for forecasting (i.e., if the bank is highly credible), then firm decisions are such that the announcement is in fact realized. The opposite is true if the bank is not credible. The fraction of firms with announcement-consistent forecasts is thus a crucial variable in our model and we endogenize it using social dynamics. In particular, once inflation has been realized, firms can meet and potentially switch forecasting rules based on relative performance. A small and/or temporary divergence of realized inflation from the central bank's announcements may not have enough momentum to significantly affect credibility. However, prolonged divergence may convince some firms to abandon the central bank's cues in favor of more successful forecasting rules, limiting the extent to which future announcements will be realized. Combining our model of inflation determination with our model of social dynamics, we investigate how announcements can be tailored to limit divergence and build credibility.
Our analysis yields three main insights. First, we show that abruptly introducing a low inflation target to achieve a large disinflation can cause temporary overshooting of the target, even when the central bank is transparent and firms reset prices every period. In contrast, gradually introducing the target (i.e., via interim targets) directs the economy to the long-term goal more smoothly because the interim targets provide more scope for credibility-building when beliefs evolve through social dynamics. Our model thus suggests a novel explanation for overshooting differences among the inflation targeters studied in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) . Second, we show that gradual strategies are actually less effective in a deflation. Instead, the central bank can eliminate deflation more quickly by communicating an aggressive increase in its short-term inflation goals. Our results thus suggest that price-level targeting may have some communication-based benefits over inflation targeting during a deflation. Lastly, we show how two dimensions of quantitative easingnumber of rounds and intensity of announcements -can be varied to guide the economy out of We begin by describing how announcements, expectations, and inflation will come together in this paper. There are three important features. First, how is inflation determined given a set of inflation expectations? Second, how do central bank announcements affect expectations?
Third, how does realized inflation affect expectations? We take each question in turn. The focus here will be on intuition, with more formal structure deferred until Sections 3 and 4.
Inflation Determination Consider a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 1]. At the beginning of date t, firm i expects an inflation rate of π i t . The mean expectation is g and the standard deviation across all firms is σ. We are primarily interested in how σ affects the actual inflation rate realized at the end of date t. Our full model of inflation determination is developed in Section 4 so the goal at present is to distill only the key forces that will emerge. On one hand, we will have a Jensen's inequality effect which is fairly standard in the finance literature.
4 As σ increases, compounding of inflation expectations into price expectations skews the distribution of price expectations right and, all else constant, drives up market clearing prices. In finance, the market clearing price is typically a nominal bond price. In our model, it will be a nominal input price. On the other hand, as the nominal input price increases, low expectation firms in our environment have less incentive to operate (i.e., all else is not constant). The Jensen's effect, J (σ), thus triggers a countervailing exit effect, Q (σ), where J (0) = Q (0) = 0, J (·) > 0, and Q (·) > 0. With a natural upper bound on exit though, the Jensen's effect eventually outpaces the exit effect and yields the following:
Lemma 1 If there exists a σ A > 0 such that Q (σ A ) = J (σ A ) and Q (σ A ) > J (σ A ), then there exists a σ B > σ A such that Q (σ B ) = J (σ B ) and Q (σ) > J (σ) for all σ ∈ (σ A , σ B ).
Provided there is a positive relationship between input and output prices, the mapping of inflation expectations into realized inflation is π * t ≈ g + λ (σ) [J (σ) − Q (σ)], where λ (·) > 0.
4 See, for example, Veronesi and Yared (2000) and Xiong and Yan (2010) .
Central Bank Announcements To introduce announcements into this environment, suppose the central bank releases an inflation forecast of π t at the beginning of date t.
Under Lemma 1, we can consider two forecasting rules for firms: Rule A which draws π i t from N (π t , σ A ) and Rule B which draws π i t from N (g t , σ B ). We discuss these rules more formally in Section 5. 
ξ t = 1 will allow the central bank to achieve inflation goals using only communication. As such, we can also interpret ξ t as a measure of central bank credibility.
Conditional on the forecasting rules N (π t , σ 2 A ) and N (g t , σ 2 B ), it is now apparent that the pass-through from an inflation announcement π t to realized inflation π * t will hinge on ξ t .
Completing our framework thus requires modeling the evolution of ξ t .
Evolution of Expectations
We posit that agents whose forecasts are consistently outperformed by their peers will want to change how they forecast. The question then becomes how an agent discovers he is being outperformed and how much of this outperformance he attributes to one-time shocks rather than fundamentals. Social dynamics provide a simple yet powerful way to address these questions and endogenize the evolution of ξ t .
The details are presented in Section 3. What we emphasize here is that ξ t is endogenously determined through social dynamics. That ξ t is endogenous rather than deterministic is fundamental. As we saw above, π * t ≈ π t if ξ t = 1. However, to reach high ξ t endogenously, firms must be convinced that the central bank's announcements provide a good basis for forecasting. The announcements will indeed provide a good basis if ξ has been high his-torically. Therefore, there is a two-way feedback between selection of forecasting rules and realized inflation which both disciplines how central bank announcements steer inflation and introduces non-trivial inflation dynamics into the model.
Social Dynamics
As described above, we adopt social dynamics to endogenize the fraction of firms who use central bank announcements as a basis for their forecasts. To this end, we initialize ξ 1 = 0 then let ξ t+1 evolve via tournament selection and mutation.
We use tournament selection to simulate the transmission of information in a complex 
Recall from Section 2 that π * t depends on ξ t . For example, if ξ t is too low, then π * t will be close to g t so |g t − π t | 0 will allow Rule B to outperform Rule A in many meetings. Strikes will thus tend to be counted against Rule A, suggesting ξ t+1 ≤ ξ t . In contrast, if ξ t is sufficiently high, then π * t will be close to π t and strikes will tend to be counted against Rule B, suggesting ξ t+1 ≥ ξ t . This is the sense in which success is endogenous.
Whether strikes actually lead to ξ t+1 = ξ t depends on how stubborn firms are in their beliefs. Experimental evidence suggests that people are very reluctant to contradict their own information, even when Bayesian updating suggests they should (e.g., Weizsacker (2010) and Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) ). We thus allow firms to accumulate several strikes before deciding to switch forecasting rules. This is the sense in which success is judged over multiple observations. Going forward, we use S to denote the number of strikes needed for a switch (i.e., after S strikes, firm i switches rules and begins counting strikes against his new rule).
We also refer to S as stubbornness, with higher S implying more stubborn beliefs. To gauge the importance of S, we will simulate our model for different values. As Section 5.3 will show, the extent of stubbornness is an important input into our social dynamics.
Strikes accumulate across meetings and periods so we must now specify how pairwise meetings come about. In our baseline specification, pairs are drawn randomly with replacement from the entire population. Drawing with replacement ensures that each firm can have zero to many meetings in a given period. Drawing from the full population ensures that even firms who do not operate are represented in tournaments. This is appealing since operation decisions are driven by expectations. In an alternative specification, we allow tournaments to occur within neighborhoods rather than at random. More specifically, imagine that firms lie along a circle and each firm meets its right and left neighbors every period. With interactions set up as such, firms always meet the same people. As we will see in Section 5, this will create clusters of firms that use the same forecasting rule. Firms at the center of a cluster are thus more likely to meet other firms using the same rule, increasing their effective stubbornness for any value of S. Notice that this suggests an alternative interpretation for our S: higher values of S are a stand-in for more localized interactions.
Lastly, to capture the fact that some changes may not be performance-driven, we incorporate mutations: at the beginning of date t + 1, a very small fraction µ ∈ (0, 1) of firms randomly switches rules regardless of strikes.
The timing of our social forces can be summarized as follows: (i) mutation turns the fraction of Rule A forecasters into ξ t = (1 − µ) ξ t + µ (1 − ξ t ) if t ≥ 2; (ii) each firm i draws expectation π i t from its forecasting rule; (iii) the set of expectations π
determines π * t as per the model developed next in Section 4; (iv) tournament selection transforms ξ t into ξ t+1 if t = 1 and ξ t into ξ t+1 if t ≥ 2.
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While instructive, our discussion of inflation determination in Section 2 was highly stylized.
We now develop a more formal model. Subsection 4.1 presents the environment. Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 then flesh out the details to derive the specific functions we use in our simulations.
Environment
Consider a continuum of firms, each producing a differentiated perishable good i ∈ [0, 1].
Demand for good i is D
, where p it is the price charged by firm i at date t, P t is the aggregate price level, and γ t ∈ [1 − ε, 1 + ε] is an exogenous and independently distributed aggregate taste shock. Assume D (·) > 0 so that the demand for good i is decreasing in the relative price
and increasing in the taste shock. Supply of good i is chosen by firm i which possesses a technology to transform inputs into output. The technology is summarized by
, where it denotes the labor input used by firm i. The aggregate stock of labor is normalized to one and inelastically available at unit wage w t .
Firms have to make pricing and production decisions before γ t and P t are realized -that is, before they know the actual demand for their products. At the beginning of date t, all firms forecast a taste shock of one. Each firm i also forecasts an aggregate price level of Putting everything together, we now have the following mapping from a set of expecta-
Realized inflation is defined as π * t ≡ ln P * t /P * t−1 . The rest of this section puts structure on
, and (·) to refine the mapping in equations (1) and (2).
Additional Structure
We will assume D
1−ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1) and derive p (·) and (·) from a static profit maximization problem. The following proposition disciplines our approach:
The first part of Proposition 1 says that a linear one-to-one production technology delivers homogeneous price-setting behavior among firms, regardless of expectations. The second part says that it also delivers realized inflation above the mean expectation when expectations are heterogeneous and all firms produce. The latter is the Jensen's inequality result discussed in Section 2. It is exacerbated by more heterogeneity (i.e., higher σ) and more substitutability between goods (i.e., higher ρ). As σ increases, compounding of inflation expectations into price expectations skews the distribution of price expectations further right. The highest expectation firms thus drive input costs and prices up more than the lowest expectation firms drive them down. The effect is strongest when goods are more substitutable because high expectation firms foresee a huge increase in sales by undercutting the aggregate price level and thus participate more actively in the labor market.
As per Woodford (2013), "it is appealing to assume that people's beliefs should be rational, in the ordinary-language sense, though there is a large step from this to the RE hypothesis." Together with the results of Proposition 1, this prompts us to adopt F ( , ·) = and allow w * t ; P i t = 0 for some i. Why is F ( , ·) = desirable? Our taste shock is realized after the auctioneer computes w *
The Full Model
Suppose good i is produced according to
it , where it is again labor, z it is firm effort, and α ∈ (0, 1). All firms also have a real outside option U , thus allowing for exit and (re)entry. Effort is exerted by the firm and imparts (real) disutility
, where θ > 1. If θ is finite, then production exhibits diminishing returns to labor but constant returns overall.
If θ is infinite, then effort is always unity and the production function is effectively decreasing returns to scale. Our numerical exercises will employ the limiting case of θ → ∞ to simplify the parameter space. However, we will derive the key properties of our model for any θ > 1 to show that they do not hinge on decreasing returns to scale.
If firm i charges p it , its anticipated demand is
1−ρ and it will need
units of labor to produce this quantity. Therefore, in real terms, the firm solves:
From the inner maximization problem, the price and effort choices of an operating firm are:
From the outer maximization problem, the set of operating firms is then:
, then the firm's labor demand is w t ; P i t = 0. Otherwise, the first order conditions from the inner problem yield:
thus what will permit w t ; P i t = 0 for some i. The market clearing wage is then determined according to equation (1), with O t (w * t ) given more precisely by equation (4) and w t ; P i t as per equation (5). This yields:
where
Finally, the aggregate price level is determined according to equation (2), with p w t ; P i t and O t (w * t ) as per (3) and (4). The above equations show that operating firms with higher price expectations charge higher prices. They also hire more labor and exert more effort, resulting in more output. Furthermore, for any given wage, firms with higher price expectations are more likely to operate. The higher the wage though, the smaller the set of operating firms, the lower the output of each operating firm, and the higher the prices charged.
One Forecasting Rule
The following proposition establishes the key implications of our full model when all expectations are neatly captured by a single normal distribution:
2 ) for all i, then:
as per Proposition 1.
3. If α ≤ 1 and U > 0, then the set of operating firms is shrinking in σ.
5. There exist constants α ∈ (0, 1) and U > U > 0 such that α ∈ (α, 1) and
The first part of Proposition 2 says that excess inflation (π * t − g) depends only on the extent of expectations heterogeneity. The second part then says that linear production and no outside option return the results of Proposition 1. The remainder of Proposition 2 restricts attention to positive outside options. In particular, the third part establishes that σ decreases operation when the option is positive. As discussed in Subsection 4.2, higher σ amplifies the asymmetric effect that high expectation firms have on wage determination.
Since higher wages cut into expected firm profits, the presence of a positive outside option means that more firms will choose not to operate. This puts downward pressure on wages and, as described in Section 2, helps offset the Jensen's inequality effect. Indeed, with linear production, the fourth part of Proposition 2 shows that a sufficiently lucrative outside option introduces a point σ 0 > 0 with no excess inflation (i.e., a point where f (·) = 0 or, equivalently, a point of mean rationality). This is illustrated by the solid gray line in Figure 1 .
Existence of such a point is robust to non-linearities in production and, under some restrictions on α and U , the fifth part of Proposition 2 says that our full model actually produces two mean rational points. This is a more formal version of Lemma 1, with conditions to ensure the existence of both points.
Figure 2 provides a visual of the relevant parameter restrictions when ρ = 0.9 and θ → ∞.
As both the proposition and the figure show, we will have two mean rational points if α is not too small and U falls within an intermediate range. Moreover, for any parameter combination represented by a blue dot in Figure 2 (i.e., for any combination that yields two mean rational points), the plot of f (·) will resemble the blue line in Figure 1 . Notice from this line that f (·) is negative between the two mean rational points. In other words, realized inflation falls below the mean expectation. We refer to this situation as negative excess inflation. To see why it arises, recall the competing effects of higher σ on wages in equation (6). As σ increases, we know that the compounding of inflation expectations into price expectations skews the distribution of price expectations right and puts upward pressure on the wage through the labor demands of high expectation firms. As the wage increases though, we also know that low expectation firms find it more profitable to take their outside option and the resulting decline in operation puts downward pressure on the wage. For lower values of σ, the exit of low expectation firms dominates and dampens the wage but, when σ becomes sufficiently large, the labor demands of high expectation firms take over. The dependence of w * t on σ is thus U-shaped. What does this mean for prices? We know from equation (3) that individual prices respond positively to wages so, all else constant, the shape of w * t feeds into P * t and π * t (for a given P * t−1 ). Notice, however, that there is additional upward pressure on P * t at the price aggregation stage. Since only firms with sufficiently high expectations produce, the individual prices aggregated by equation (2) are p w * t ; P i t with P i t high. Therefore, the pass-through from w * t to P * t varies across σ but, for α ∈ (α, 1) and U ∈ U , U , it is enough to generate two mean rational points with a U-shaped pattern in between. If the outside option is too high or the returns to labor are too low, then exit is too strong relative to labor demand and we get only one mean rational point with negative excess inflation to the left of that point and positive excess inflation to the right. If the outside option is too low, then exit is weak and we get positive excess inflation everywhere with no mean rational points.
Two Forecasting Rules
We now investigate what happens if expectations are characterized by a mixture of normal distributions, namely a group of size ξ t distributed according to π . Notice that we now have two dimensions of heterogeneity: within groups (i.e., σ A > 0 and σ B > 0) and across groups (i.e., g A = g B and/or σ A = σ B ). It will be instructive to begin with g A = g B = g for any g. 6 To simplify the exposition, define the following constants:
, and υ j ≡
. We use y t (multiplied by 1 − ρ) to denote excess inflation when expectations come from two normal distributions and reserve f (·) for when they come from one normal distribution. Interpretation of x t is with reference to equation (4). In particular, if the difference between a firm's inflation forecast and the mean forecast is greater than or equal to x t , then the firm operates. The full model with a mixture of normal expectations yields x t implicitly defined by:
If x t ≥ Υ (x t , ξ t ) + ln (γ t ), then y t = Υ (x t , ξ t ) where:
If x t < Υ (x t , ξ t ) + ln (γ t ), then y t solves:
The limiting cases of ξ t = 0 and ξ t = 1 return the full model with expectations characterized by a single normal distribution. For a mixture of distributions, we have:
A ) for a group of measure ξ t and π Under α = 1, Proposition 3 says that the entire population is mean rational when each subpopulation is individually mean rational. We know from Proposition 1 that all firms set the same price when α = 1 so any heterogeneity in expectations only affects the economy through labor market clearing, namely equation (1). The latter aggregates linearly across subpopulations so, if the component distributions are parameterized such that y t = 0, then their mixture will also deliver y t = 0.
In contrast, Figure 3 shows what can happen when heterogeneity enters the more complicated aggregation defined by equations (1) and (2): the mixture distribution produces negative excess inflation even if each subpopulation possesses the mean rational property.
Using ρ = 0.9 and θ → ∞ as before, panel (a) reveals that combinations of α and U which generate two distinct mean rational distributions also generate negative excess inflation for any mixture of these distributions. Panel (b) then provides a representative plot of y t as a function of ξ t . Notice that the shape of y t over ξ t ∈ [0, 1] resembles the shape of f (·) over
. This is useful as it permits interpretation of our results vis-à-vis Figure 1 : if one views ξ t ∈ (0, 1) and g A = g B = g as generating a roughly normal aggregate distribution with σ ∈ (σ A , σ B ), then π * t < g follows for the reasons discussed in Subsection 4.3.1.
Simulations: Introducing Inflation Targets
From the economic model of Section 4, we can calculate π * t conditional on ξ t and the forecasting rules. Using social dynamics as per Section 3, we can then determine ξ t+1 conditional on π * t , ξ t , and the forecasting rules. We now investigate how a central bank can use inflation an-nouncements in this environment. We first parameterize the model then conduct simulations to study the effectiveness of announcing inflation targets to achieve a large disinflation.
Parameterization
We set ρ = 0.9 to capture an economy where goods are highly but not perfectly substitutable.
We also take the limiting case of θ → ∞. To obtain two individually mean rational subpopulations (i.e., to obtain two forecasting rules that are each unbiased when adopted by all firms), we pick α and U from the blue region in Figure 2 . We set α = 0.9 and U = 0.18 but any choice from the aforementioned region will deliver qualitatively similar results. Lastly, we assume the taste shock is distributed according to γ t ∼ U [0.99, 1.01]. These parameters deliver σ A = 0.0036 and σ B = 0.0643 as the solutions to f (·) = 0.
To complete the characterization of the forecasting rules, we need g A and g B . In a special question, the 2012Q2 Philadelphia Fed Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) asked each respondent to indicate whether his/her forecasts were consistent with the Fed's inflation target. The results reveal that forecasters who self-identify as consistent with the Fed's target form a tight distribution around this target. In contrast, the remaining forecasters form a wider distribution around past inflation. As in Section 2, let π t denote the central bank's date t announcement. Since individual expectations and professional forecasts are not unrelated (e.g. Carroll (2003b)), we can map the SPF results into our model as follows:
The measure of FFs is ξ t . That our first group uses the central bank to guide its expectations can be interpreted in light of Faust and Wright (2012) who find that the Fed's Greenbook forecasts are difficult to beat. That our second group follows a random walk can then be interpreted in light of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) who find that a random walk forecast of inflation also performs very well against more sophisticated econometric models.
Results for Baseline Specification
In our baseline social dynamics, randomly matched firms compare forecasting performance and switch rules after being outperformed eight times (i.e., S = 8). We use 1000 firms and draw 1000 matches (with replacement) at the end of each period. Figure 4 presents results for the introduction of a 2% inflation target in an economy with 20% initial inflation. Blue lines average over 100 simulations while shaded areas are [10%, 90%] confidence intervals.
Initially, ξ 1 = 0 so all firms are forecasting according to π If beliefs were not stubborn (i.e., if S was low), RWs would switch very quickly and ξ t would rise sharply. Virtually all firms would then forecast according to π In particular, data from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) reveals that countries such as Chile, Mexico, Columbia, and Peru introduced their targets more gradually than countries such as Canada, Sweden, the UK, and the Czech Republic. Incidentally, the first group seems to have experienced less overshooting than the second.
Results for Alternative Specifications
Lower Stubbornness The results so far have considered firms that are somewhat stubborn in their beliefs, refusing to switch forecasting rules at the first sign of a better rule.
We now use S = 1 to see what happens if beliefs are less stubborn. Figure 5 shows that an abrupt introduction no longer leads to overshooting. As noted earlier, RWs who are not stubborn will switch rules very quickly once inflation approaches 2%, implying excess inflation of virtually zero. Notice, however, that S = 1 converges more slowly than S = 8 and with wider confidence bands. Slower convergence stems from fewer FFs persisting in early tournament selections. Without a large endowment of FFs, realized inflation remains relatively close to 20% for the first few periods so the huge gap between 20% and the mean FF forecast of 2% implies that FF forecasts are almost always outperformed by RW forecasts. Under low stubbornness, this will prompt FFs to switch rules very quickly and return to the labor market, thus mitigating the downward pressure through input prices. Wider confidence bands stem from ξ t (and thus π * t ) being more sensitive to the specific pattern of random meetings during tournament selection now that firms do not distinguish between one-time outperformance and sustained outperformance. Stubbornness thus has advantages and disadvantages for a central bank trying to achieve a drastic reduction in inflation. On one hand, higher stubbornness among FFs yields faster and more certain convergence to the bank's target but, on the other hand, higher stubbornness among RWs leads to a temporary overshooting of the target if the target is introduced abruptly.
Local Interactions
We now return to S = 8 and relax the assumption that firms meet at random to compare forecasting rules. Suppose instead that tournaments occur locally, with each firm meeting its right and left neighbors every period. As discussed in Section 3, this set up will lead to clusters of FFs and clusters of RWs, increasing the effective stubbornness of firms at the center of each cluster. Figure 6 illustrates the clustering for a subset of 300 firms. A white (blue) dot at coordinate (i, t) means that firm i is a RW (FF) at date t.
Figure 7 then shows that overshooting will be more pronounced under an abrupt target and the central bank will need to be more gradual to prevent it if interactions are local rather than random. This is consistent with local interactions generating more stubbornness.
Comparison to Benchmarks
Fixed Proportions A key insight from the above discussion is that the occurrence of overshooting hinges on the fraction of FFs when the economy reaches the long-run target.
To better appreciate the role of social dynamics in determining this fraction, it will be instructive to compare our baseline results with a benchmark that fixes ξ t = ξ for all t. The comparison is presented in Figure 8 for different values of ξ. If ξ = 0 (i.e., if the central bank is never credible and no one uses its announcements as a basis for forecasting), then inflation is stable at 20% and announcements are never effective. In contrast, if ξ = 1 (i.e., if the central bank is always credible and everyone uses its announcements as a basis for forecasting), then the introduction of abrupt targets makes inflation fall to 2% immediately and with no overshooting. Consider now ξ ∈ (0, 1) so that the mix of FFs and RWs is constant but interior. The introduction of targets still succeeds in lowering inflation but we do not drop to 2% immediately. Moreover, if the mix of FFs and RWs is sufficiently interior, then inflation settles noticeably below 2%. With a constant mix, ξ t is independent of how the central bank introduces its target and how well different rules perform so there is no mechanism to eliminate overshooting. Endogenizing credibility thus introduces an important channel through which central bank announcements affect inflation, providing a richer and more plausible set of dynamics.
Mutation Only Recall that our social dynamics have two elements: mutation and tournament selection. To see the impact of each, Figure 9 compares the full dynamics from Figure 4 against the results that would arise under only mutation. With just mutation, ξ t+1 = (1 − µ) ξ t + µ (1 − ξ t ) for all t so the fraction of FFs converges smoothly to 0.5. The contribution of tournaments over and above mutation is visible at several points. When targets are introduced abruptly, many FF forecasts are initially outperformed by RWs so tournaments slow the accumulation of FFs and extend the time needed to hit 2%. Around 2% though, the tables turn and many RW forecasts are outperformed by FFs so tournaments accelerate the accumulation of FFs and ensure convergence to 2%. Moreover, when targets are introduced gradually, the accelerated accumulation occurs before 2% is actually reached, allowing convergence to be achieved without even a temporary overshooting. Again then, letting credibility evolve within the model generates fundamentally different predictions.
Simulations: Eliminating Deflation
Having seen how communication can be used to reduce inflation, we now investigate how it can be used to pull the economy out of deflation. We keep the parameterization as in Subsection 5.1 and start by considering announcements regarding the 2% target. We then move to announcements like the Fed's recent Quantitative Easing (QE) program which have the potential to skew the entire distribution of inflation expectations.
Using Targets
Suppose the economy starts at −2% inflation and the central bank announces that it will target 2% for all t. In our previous simulations, FFs were the low expectation firms and their initial impact was to decrease inflation via exit. Now, however, FFs are the high expectation firms so their initial impact is to increase inflation via price-setting. For our baseline specification, Figure 10 shows that the accumulation of FFs -at first through mutation and later through tournament selection -eventually brings the economy up to 2%. Figure 11( a) then shows that convergence to 2% now occurs more quickly under lower stubbornness. The difference between initial inflation of −2% and the mean FF forecast of 2% is such that FFs are not always outperformed by RWs in early tournaments. As a result, some Random Walkers incur strikes early on and, the faster they switch rules, the faster 2% is reached. As discussed in Subsection 5.3, local interactions increase effective stubbornness so, for a given value of S, local rather than random interactions would increase the time it takes to reach 2% when the economy begins at −2%. This is confirmed by Figure 11 (b).
So far, we have assumed that the central bank keeps the target at 2% for all t. What happens if it instead decides to gradually lead the economy back to 2%? As Figure 12(a) reveals, a very gradual strategy involves more persistent deflation early on. Recall from Subsection 4.3 that firms with higher price expectations set higher prices. The central bank's gradual path initially implies π 1 = −2% + ε where ε > 0 is small so the average FF only sets a slightly higher price than the average RW. The upward pressure from FF price-setting thus does not outpace the downward pressure from RW exit and the economy continues to experience deflation.
Lastly, Figure 12 (b) shows that aggressive communication may be the best at eliminating deflation. The path we consider is one where the central bank announces short-term targets that are well above the long-run goal of 2%. Aggressive short-term targets induce any FFs to set very high prices, pushing realized inflation upwards. At the same time, however, the big gap between realized and targeted inflation does nothing to help the central bank accumulate more FFs and bring ξ t towards 1. Therefore, when the target returns to 2% and the economy approaches it from above, we have the same overshooting problem we had in Figure 4 (a).
In order to eliminate this dip, the central bank would have to implement a gradual path on the way down to 2% and thus keep the economy above 2% for longer. To some extent, these results suggest that price-level targeting -which would indeed require the bank to balance out periods of deflation with periods of high inflation -has some advantages over inflation targeting in dealing with deflations when expectations exhibit some stubbornness.
Quantitative Easing
Our focus thus far has been on how central banks can use precise announcements about inflation to steer the course of actual inflation. To avoid any premature assumptions about the power of the bank, we restricted the direct effect of its announcements to just the mean of the FF distribution. If the bank has absolutely no followers, then the announcements are irrelevant as illustrated in Figure 8(a) . If the bank has at least a few followers, then we showed how announcements can be tailored to endogenously increase this following by capitalizing on the social dynamics between firms.
We now consider what happens if central bank communication is more potent than previously assumed. In particular, instead of just changing the mean of the FF distribution, suppose announcements can directly affect the skewness of the economy-wide distribution.
A practical example is what Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) dub the inflation channel of QE -that is, the curtailment of deflation expectations due to publicity surrounding the Fed's recent large-scale asset purchases. We introduce this channel into our model via redraws. More precisely, some firms with deflationary expectations redraw their π i t 's after hearing that the central bank will take a proactive approach to stimulating the economy.
Each redraw comes from the same distribution as the original draw so not all deflationary expectations will be eliminated. However, redraws do have the effect of skewing the RW and FF distributions so that more mass exists to the right of the mean. Since very few FFs actually expect deflation, the skew is stronger for RWs but, either way, the effect of QE communications is to increase expectations, reduce dispersion, enlarge the set of operating firms (by extension of Proposition 2, part 3), and put upward pressure on inflation.
We consider two dimensions of QE: rounds and intensity. In our context, rounds means the number of periods with media coverage about QE and, therefore, the number of periods that have redraws. Intensity means the fraction of deflationary firms that are exposed to this coverage and, therefore, the fraction that redraw in a given period. Our central bank again faces −2% inflation but, as an inflation targeter, would like to return the economy to 2% without changing its short-term targets (i.e., without pursuing the aggressive strategy in Figure 12(b) ). Figures 13 and 14 illustrate how this can be achieved in our baseline specification (S = 8, random interactions) by varying rounds and intensity.
To isolate the effect of rounds, Figure 13 fixes intensity at 1. In other words, QE announcements are so pervasive and authoritative that all firms with deflationary expectations redraw. Panel (a) demonstrates that one round of QE announcements helps increase inflation but more time is needed to accumulate FFs and reach 2%. Panel (b) shows that two rounds of QE announcements actually push the economy above 2% for a short-time then below 2% for several periods. If the central bank wants to eliminate the dip back below target, it must increase the number of rounds. However, increasing rounds without decreasing intensity means that the bank has to tolerate more above-target inflation. Finally, Figure 14 (b) illustrates the outcome of many rounds and low intensity. Why do many rounds make it possible to find a monotonicity-inducing intensity? Avoiding the rise above 2% experienced in Figure 13 (b) requires stopping QE right when inflation hits its target. At the same time, avoiding the dip below 2% experienced in Figure 14 (a) requires a very high fraction of FFs when QE stops. Therefore, with T rounds of QE, the bank has T periods to accomplish two things: hit 2% and accumulate a lot of FFs. As we shorten T , accumulating a lot of FFs requires higher intensity. However, higher intensity also hastens the return to 2%. When firms are stubborn in their beliefs, a small increase in intensity will have a stronger effect on the speed of recovery than it will on the accumulation of FFs.
The intensity increase needed to accumulate enough FFs thus exceeds the intensity increase needed to hit 2%. Stated otherwise, decreasing the number of rounds makes it harder to find an intensity that returns inflation to 2% monotonically.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effectiveness of central bank communication when pricesetters with heterogeneous inflation expectations are subject to social dynamics. Prolonged periods of divergence between realized inflation and central bank announcements can lead to a loss of credibility through these dynamics and make future announcements much less effective. In this context, we identified how central bank communications can be tailored to endogenously build credibility. We demonstrated that the abrupt introduction of lower inflation targets can lead to a temporary overshooting of the target. In contrast, gradually introducing the target (i.e., via interim targets) directs the economy to the long-term goal more smoothly. Our next set of results concerned communications to guide the economy away from deflation. We found that avoiding a protracted deflation requires an aggressive rather than gradual approach, with price-level targeting conferring some communicationbased benefits over inflation targeting. We then studied two dimensions of quantitative easing: number of rounds and intensity of announcements. Our results indicated that the inflation channel of QE is an effective way for an inflation targeting central bank to guide the economy out of deflation without announcing higher short-term targets. However, the mix of rounds and intensity needed to guide the economy out monotonically depends on the stubbornness of agents' beliefs. 
Using P i t = exp π i t P t−1 and π i t = g + ε it with ε it ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) in equation (4), we can rewrite the operation constraint as:
To ease notation, define the following constants: − ρ, 1 ≡ ( α, 1). Therefore, there must exist a σ A ∈ (0, σ B ) satisfying f (σ A ) = 0 and f (σ A ) < 0 when U ∈ U − , U and α ∈ ( α, 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
To simplify notation, define λ ≡ = 1 for i ∈ {A, B} so equation (19) implies y t < 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore, y t = 0 for ξ t ∈ (0, 1).
